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| Though the concept of causation is not to be found in the external world itself, that does not mean that we have no grounds for imputing causation to experience. | |
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| How can we "place" causation in experience, then expect that our experience is of independent existents? | |
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| In fact, we construct experience, so it is useless to talk about these independent existents. Though they exist by implication, they mean nothing to us. | |
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| And what you're left with is no necessary connection between anything and anything else. Way to go. | |
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| So you're saying there was no necessary connection between that bottle of vodka you drank and that pool of vomit you were lying in this morning? | |
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